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DUALISTIC LEGAL PHENOMENA AND THE
LIMITATIONS OF POSITIVISM
[A] right can only be secure if its limitations are defined within
a framework of principle.
-Justice William J. Brennan'
Often, in a case of first instance, ajudge will reach a decision by an
appeal to legal principles. For example, in the 1889 case of Riggs v.
Palmer2 a New York court had to decide whether a grandson who had
murdered his grandfather could inherit under the will in which his
grandfather had named him an heir. The statutes and rules of testa-
mentary law did not prohibit the inheritance. The court, however, in-
voked the legal principle that no one should be permitted to profit by
his own wrong and denied the claim to inheritance. The use of such
principles by courts raises an important question for legal theory: Do
these principles exist within or without the legal system? s
This Note argues that an adequate conception of a legal system
must include principles capable of justifying rules and acts. Part I de-
scribes two versions of positivist legal theory-one that contains only
rules and another that includes principles derived from rules-and
demonstrates that Professor Dworkin, while claiming to refute positiv-
ism, has actually advanced a theory consistent with the latter version.
Part II argues that both versions of positivism are inadequate because
they fail to describe and explain adequately some systemic operations,
including legal fictions, and some legal phenomena, including adverse
possession. Part III outlines a legal theory in which rules and nonderiv-
ative principles are equally basic and illustrates how such a theory is
capable of describing and explaining complex legal phenomena.
I. CONTOURS OF CURRENT THEORY
Legal positivism stresses the separation of law and morals. This
approach to legal theory is compatible with two different conceptions
of a legal system: one that excludes principles from the law and an-
other that includes principles as part of the law, but only insofar as they
are derived from the legal rules. The compatibility of positivism with
1. Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 450 (1962) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
2. 115 N.Y. 506, 22 N.E. 188 (1889); see also B. Cardozo, The Nature of the Judi-
cial Process 40-41 (1921) ("Conflicting principles were there in competition for the
mastery.").
3. This issue is separate from the question whether any meaningful notion of a
legal system must include an appeal to moral principles. This second issue was ad-
dressed in the Hart/Fuller exchange. See Fuller, Positivism and Fidelity to Law-A Re-
ply to Professor Hart, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 630 (1958); Hart, Positivism and the Separation
of Law and Morals, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 593 (1958).
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derivative principles undermines Professor Dworkin's purported refu-
tation of legal positivism.
A. Two Forms of Legal Positivism
Legal positivism propounds one primary and two derivative theses
about the nature of law. First and most important, it asserts that law
does not have any inherent moral value:4 its existence is independent
of the standards that may be used for its evaluation.5 Second, legal
positivism holds that a legal system is primarily6 a system of rules.7
Logically all rules are alike: either their operative facts occur and they
apply, or their operative facts do not occur and they do not apply.8
Finally, legal positivism holds that the existence of law is a social fact.9
The question of its existence has an empirically ascertainable answer in
the practices of the community.' 0
To maintain their commitment to a separation of law and morals,
positivists must develop a procedure to identify the propositions that
4. This thesis of positivism was first propounded by John Austin, who announced
that "[t]he existence of the law is one thing; its merit or demerit is another." J. Austin,
The Province ofJurisprudence Determined 184 (1832).
5. It is this thesis, more than the other two, that is most clearly associated with
positivist legal theory. See, e.g., N. MacCormick, Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory
239-40 (1978) (Legal positivism may be "characterized minimally as insisting on the
genuine distinction between description of a legal system as it is and normative evalua-
tion of the law which is thus described."). Some scholars have rejected the primacy of
this tenet in their characterization of positivism, see infra note 13.
6. See infra notes 17-18 and accompanying text.
7. Professor MacCormick has described "a central tenet of positivist legal theory"
as the claim "that every legal system comprises, or at least includes, a set of rules identi-
fiable by reference to common criteria of recognition .... ." N. MacCormick, supra
note 5, at 54. The common criteria of recognition for a legal system are those criteria
accepted by the officials of that legal system by reference to which the officials can iden-
tify the valid legal rules that it is their acknowledged duty to apply.
8. R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 24 (1978). "A rule of law is general in
terms, stipulating that whenever a given set of operative facts occurs (p), a given legal
consequence is to follow (q)." N. MacCormick, supra note 5, at 53-54. Thus, "(w]hen a
judge in a given case 'finds facts' amounting to an instance of p, the relevance of the
legal rule to the case is established, and the legal consequence q is to be applied." Id. at
54.
9. D. Lyons, Ethics and the Rule of Law 37 (1984).
10. One conducts this empirical inquiry by searching for "some feature or features
possession of which by a suggested rule is taken as a conclusive affirmative indication
that it is a rule of [law] .... ." H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law 92 (1979). These
identifying features of a law constitute the criteria of validity for a particular legal sys-
tem. They are summarized in "the rule of recognition" for that legal system. The rule
of recognition is as much a brute social fact, see D. Lyons, supra note 9, at 37, as are the
rules it recognizes. "[The rule of recognition exists only as a complex, but normally
concordant, practice of the courts, officials, and private persons in identifying the law by
reference to certain criteria. Its existence is a matter of fact." H.L.A. Hart, supra, at
107.
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make up a legal system without reference to their normative content. 1
Unable to identify the legally valid propositions by appeal to their
grammatical or logical form,' 2 positivists have instead focused upon
the readily determinable sources of rules and their adoption. By ob-
serving the practices of the officials in a particular legal system, posi-
tivists can formulate this practice as a rule of recognition-a sufficiently
rigorous and definite decision procedure for identifying the legally
valid propositions of the legal system. 13 As long as the officials of the
system do not deviate from their practices, and the general populace
continues to respect these individuals as officials by obeying their rules,
positivists will be able to identify these rules as the legally valid pro-
positions without reference to their normative content.1 4
Being committed to the thesis that law is primarily a system of
rules, positivists may develop their legal theory in either of two direc-
tions. First, they may argue that only rules compose the legal system:
that there are no legal principles. This approach will be called pure mo-
nism. Second, they may argue that while the legal system is composed
of both rules and principles, the legal principles of the system are de-
11. In this respect, positivists contrast with natural lawyers who require the norma-
tive content of a law properly so called to be "right, good and just." D. Lyons, supra note
9, at 63.
12. John Austin made this attempt when he focused upon those propositions that
were imperatives. As Austin discovered, however, the form of a proposition is insufficient
to identify it as a law. Austin was finally led to distinguish laws from other imperatives
by adding the further conditions that the imperatives of law be coercive imperatives or
commands and that they be commanded by the sovereign, a person or group of persons
who are habitually obeyed but who obey no one habitually. J. Austin, supra note 4, at
10-33. More generally, the logical or grammatical form of a proposition is insufficient
because the forms of legally valid propositions are too various and because a single form
may be extended to legally invalid propositions as well.
13. In defining positivism as a form of proceduralism, some scholars have argued
that the essential characteristic of a positivist legal theory is the claim that a decision
procedure exists for identifying the legally valid propositions of a legal system. See,
e.g., Fletcher, Two Modes of Legal Thought, 90 Yale LJ. 970, 976 (1981). This
proceduralist definition of legal positivism, however, is too broad because the existence
of a decision procedure is compatible with at least possible nonpositivist theories. For
example, one can imagine a legal theory which held that the valid propositions of a legal
system were only those that the Pope, speaking ex cathedra, had articulated. The neces-
sary moral-theological content of these propositions would prevent the theory from be-
ing a positivist legal theory (since law would necessarily have a positive moral value)
even though a definite decision procedure existed for identifying the legally valid
propositions.
14. Professor H.L.A. Hart, for example, is a positivist who explicitly recognizes
these two constraints. He has argued that "[t]here are ... two minimum conditions
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a legal system. On the one hand, those rules
of behaviour which are valid according to the system's ultimate criteria of validity must
be generally obeyed, and, on the other hand, its rule of recognition specifying the crite-
ria of legal validity and its rules of change and adjudication must be effectively accepted
as common public standards of official behaviour by its officials." H.L.A. Hart, supra
note 10, at 113.
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rived from the legal rules. This approach will be called mixed monism.
Because principles do not come from any identifiable source, 15 mixed
monistic positivists are only able to embrace legal principles that are
identifiable through their relation to the rules. These rules are, in turn,
identifiable by the rule of recognition, whose existence itself is an ob-
servable fact. Positivists must exclude principles not derived 16 from the
rules of the legal system: their inclusion would break this chain of iden-
tification. In this fashion, mixed monistic positivists conceive legal
principles as merely epiphenomenal to and parasitic upon rules. While
some positivists have maintained that the law is composed exclusively
of rules,' 7 most contemporary positivists would concede the existence
of legal principles.' 8
Both pure and mixed monism are forms of legal monism because
they take only one kind of proposition, rules, as basic in legal ontology.
In contrast, a theory that embraces nonderivative legal principles takes
at least two kinds of propositions, rules and principles, as basic in legal
ontology. This latter approach to legal theory will be called legal
dualism.
In contrast to rules,' 9 principles do not operate in an all-or-noth-
ing fashion. Nor do principles attach definite legal consequences to
particular kinds of situations. 20 A principle points out a direction in
which the decisionmaker should proceed and expresses a value that
must be weighed in the decision of any particular case on which it
bears. Just as one may be committed in different degrees to different
values, so too different principles may carry different degrees of weight-
iness. 2' The greater the weight of a particular principle, the greater the
role that principle will play in a decision. 22 Thus, while the application
of rules may be viewed as a relatively mechanical operation, the use of
principles requires a more reflective grasp of the weight of competing
principles and the inimitable scales of justice.23
15. See infra notes 25-27 and accompanying text.
16. To derive principles from a set of rules may be loosely defined as articulating
principles that are consistent with the rules and that manifest the coherence of the set.
17. See, e.g., H.L.A. Hart, supra note 10.
18. See, e.g., N. MacCormick, supra note 5.
19. See supra note 8 and accompanying text.
20. See R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 25-26.
21. See id.
22. Cf. N. MacCormick, supra note 5, at 260 ("a principle. . . is . . . a relatively
general norm which from the point of view of the person who holds it as a principle, is
regarded as a desirable general norm to adhere to, and which thus has explanatory and
justificatory force in relation to particular decisions, or to particular rules for
decisions.").
23. This Note does not make a distinction between principles and policies. While
Professor Dworkin makes such a distinction, R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 22-23, it does
not appear this distinction can be coherently maintained. See, e.g., Marshall, Positivism,
Adjudication, and Democracy in Law, Morality and Society 132, 136 (Hacker & Raz eds.
1979). See generally Greenawalt, Policy, Rights and Judicial Decision, 11 Ga. L. Rev.
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B. Professor Dworkin's Failure to Refute Positivism
Professor Dworkin has argued that principles must be included as
part of the legal system, and that positivism is inadequate because the
rule of recognition can neither identify which principles are legal prin-
ciples nor account for the obligations, with their differential weight,
that such principles impose. 24 He claims that one cannot "devise any
formula for testing how much and what kind of institutional support is
necessary to make a principle a legal principle, still less to fix its weight
at a particular order of magnitude."' 25 Because such an identification
and account would be too complex for any social rule to encapsulate,
he argues that one can identify a legal principle only "by grappling with
a whole set of shifting, developing and interacting standards. . . about
institutional responsibility, statutory interpretation, the persuasive
force of various sorts of precedent, the relation of all these to contem-
porary moral practices, and hosts of other such standards. ' '2 6 Profes-
sor Dworkin continues that one "could not bolt all of these together
into a single 'rule,' even a complex one . . -"27 Since positivism re-
quires a rule of recognition of this kind, he concludes, positivism is in-
compatible with the existence of legal principles and the legal
obligations that these impose.
Ironically, the failure of Professor Dworkin's argument is most eas-
ily brought out by showing how his own theory of legal principles,
which he offers to overcome the inadequacies he perceives in the posi-
tivist adjudicatory model, is in fact compatible with positivism. 28 The
most famous of the inadequacies is the "hard case" in which it is un-
clear whether or how a rule applies. According to Professor Dworkin,
991 (1977) (critiquing Professor Dworkin's distinction). This Note instead accepts the
position of Professor MacCormick that
when in law or in any other sphere we raise the question whether a given policy
goal is desirable or not, we are raising a question of principle. For any goal g,
to say that it is a goal which ought to be secured is to enunciate a principle or a
judgment dependent on some unstated but presupposed principle. For this
reason, the spheres of principle and of policy are not distinct and mutually op-
posed, but irretrievably interlocking .... To articulate the desirability of
some general policy-goal is to state a principle. To state a principle is to frame
a possible policy-goal.
N. MacCormick, supra note 5, at 263-64 (emphasis in original).
24. R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 14-45.
25. Id. at 40.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. The observation that Professor Dworkin's theory is compatible with a form of
positivism is not without precedent. Cf. Coleman, Negative and Positive Positivism, 11
J. Legal Stud. 139, 163 n.15 (1982) (claiming that Professor Dworkin "reveals himself to
be much more of a conventionalist than he would have us believe" and that his "notion
ofjustification does not establish the link between law and critical morality necessary to
undermine positivism"); MacCormick, "Principles" of Law, 19 Jurid. Rev. 217, 225
(1974) (stating that Professor Dworkin has refined positivism, not undermined it); Ten,
The Soundest Theory of Law, 88 Mind 522, 537 (1979) ("[A]lthough it is certain that
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positivists claim that in such cases a judge exercises discretion "in the
strong sense," that is, "he is simply not bound by standards set by the
authority in question." 2 9 Professor Dworkin, rejecting this adjudica-
tory model, posits a Herculean judge of superhuman skill and speed.
This judge is aware of all legal principles arranged in a complete theory
of law. He has discovered these principles through a consideration of
all sources of legal authority and has arranged them to provide "a co-
herent justification for all common law precedents and, so far as these
are to be justified on principle, constitutional and statutory provisions
as well." °30 In effect, the Herculean judge considers all prior rules of
law to construct a system of principles and then employs this system to
determine a new rule of law that covers a case of first instance. The
Herculean judge never exercises discretion in the strong sense because
he can always offer a reasoned justification consistent with prior law for
any case determination he makes. Thus, notwithstanding his earlier ar-
gument against the possibility of a rule of recognition, Professor Dwor-
kin's theory must embrace one to enable the Herculean judge to
identify the legal rules from which he derives the principles.
Under Professor Dworkin's theory, the existence of legal principles
is epiphenomenal to and parasitic upon the existence of legal rules. In
effect, the Herculean judicial theory is a mirror that reflects the light of
all prior rules of law onto a case of first instance to illuminate the new
rule necessary to its decision. Professor Dworkin provides legal princi-
ples only to create the required reflective surface. Moreover, it follows
that the judicial obligation to consider principles is derived from the
judicial obligations that the rules impose. Professor Dworkin has not
rejected the conception of law as a model of rules; he has merely modi-
fied the model to provide a coherence between old rules and new rules.
Professor Dworkin has articulated a mixed monistic conception of
principles that is compatible with positivism.3 ' He has unintentionally
demonstrated that a version of positivism is compatible with the exist-
ence of legal principles. Therefore, Professor Dworkin's own theory
Dworkin strongly disagrees with the legal positivists, it is not as yet clear whether they
should disagree with him.").
In the explanation of how Professor Dworkin's theory is compatible with positivism,
this Note will focus only on those aspects of his theory necessary for this purpose.
29. R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 32. For the judge, this authority is the authority of
law. Professor Dworkin appears to have in mind an anthropomorphized version of the
legal system that fails to command the judge with respect to the standards he ought to
deploy-the system has no rule directing the judge to a particular decision. For a dis-
cussion of Professor Dworkin's conception of discretion see Greenawalt, Discretion and
Judicial Decision: The Elusive Quest for the Fetters That Bind Judges, 75 Colum. L.
Rev. 359 (1975).
30. R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 116-17.
31. As another mixed monistic positivist has observed: "[M]y own inclination is
rather to say that Professor Dworkin has added a highly important rider to analytical
positivism than to accept that he has wholly subverted that theory." MacCormick, supra
note 28, at 225.
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refutes his contention that positivism cannot account for legal princi-
ples. While Professor Dworkin claims to have refuted positivism by
showing that there can be no direct relation between legal principles
and the rule of recognition, all he has shown is that "there is a relation-
ship between the 'rule of recognition' and principles of law, but it is an
indirect one."13 2
II. THE REFUTATION OF LEGAL PosrrIVsM
Legal monism, like any legal theory, is a theory about the legal
phenomena and systemic operations that may compose a legal system.
A legal phenomenon is any event, relation, or act to which a legal cul-
ture gives special significance. Thus, the relation of a woman to her dog
is cognized within the legal system as the relation of ownership. The
event of a child handing a penny to the proprietor of a candy store and
the shopkeeper in turn placing a piece of bubble gum in her hand is
cognized as an event of purchase. The act of one person fatally piercing
a saber through the body of another is cognized as an act of murder.
By imbuing these acts, events, and relations with special significance,
the legal system imposes a normative structure on our lives. Systemic
operations are those procedures and techniques within a legal system
that permit the creation and modification of legal phenomena. Exam-
ples include the procedures of legislation, techniques of legal reason-
ing, the judicial manipulation of rules with legal fictions, and common
law defenses. Different legal systems may create different legal phe-
nomena and employ different systemic operations.33
To give a complete account of the normative structure of a particu-
lar system, a legal theory must accomplish three goals: first, it must
describe the kinds of legal phenomena and operations that exist in that
system; 34 second, it must be able to explain the internal structure or
anatomy of each kind of legal phenomenon and operation that exists in
that system, that is, it must explain in a nonarbitrary fashion why partic-
32. N. MacCormick, supra note 5, at 233.
33. Just as one would expect a capitalist legal system to create a relation of private
ownership, one would not expect the legal system of a country formed around an ideo-
logical commitment to pure communism to create such a relation. Moreover, one would
not expect civil law systems to employ all the judicial techniques present in a common
law system. An application of a legal theory to a legal system must be able to account for
the existence of the legal phenomena created and the systemic operations employed by
that legal system.
34. This is the condition of descriptive adequacy. A theory is descriptively ade-
quate if it has embedded in it a language L such that L has a sufficient array of categories
to describe in a manner compatible with the conceptual apparatus of the theory all of the
data or phenomena that the theory must explain or systematize. "A vocabulary of terms
or concepts thus may be said to represent a means of delimiting and sorting what are
taken to be things; it is a device of reference. Concepts or terms are not in themselves,
however, capable of conveying propositions [or] beliefs .... [These latter] are depen-
dent upon an available conceptual apparatus." 1. Scheffier, Science and Subjectivity 37
(1982).
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ular types of acts carry the legal significance that they carry and why
that legal system contains the particular rules of law it contains;35 and,
third, it must offer an account or conceptualization of that legal system
as a whole that allows for the possibility of the existence of each kind of
legal phenomenon and operation with its specific structure.5 6 If a par-
ticular application of a legal theory to a legal system fails to account for
all the legal phenomena and operations of that system, then that theory
is an inadequate account both of that legal system in particular and of
legal systems in general.
While neither pure nor mixed monism necessarily implies positiv-
ism, positivism requires the adoption of either a pure or mixed monistic
theory.37 Because pure monistic theory fails to account for a prevalent
systemic operation-the legal fiction-and because neither pure nor
mixed monistic theory is able to account for the legal phenomenon of
adverse possession, monistic theory must be rejected as inadequate.
Therefore, positivism specifically and rule-based theories generally
must be rejected as inadequate.
A. Legal Fictions and the Limitations of Pure Monistic Theory
Pure monism is able to account for neither the use nor the exist-
ence of at least one systemic operation-the legal fiction. Only by in-
cluding principles in the legal system can a theory describe and explain
the existence and use of legal fictions.
A legal fiction is a falsehood that the courts treat as a truth. A legal
fiction may be propounded as a matter of fact, as when a court declares
that "the grantee of a gift has accepted it" in a case in which the grantee
of the gift did not know of it and could not possibly have accepted it;3 s
or the fiction may be offered with an articulated awareness of its falsity,
as when the fiction is preceded by such phrases as "the law presumes,"
35. This is the condition of sufficient explanatory power. The concept of explana-
tory power is comparative. A theory Ti has greater explanatory power than a theory T2
if either (1) Ti explains more of the data than T2, or (2) T1 explains the same amount of
data as T2 but with a simpler conceptual apparatus. See C. Hempel, Aspects of Scien-
tific Explanation 278 (1978).
36. The ontic possibility involved in conceptualization relates the first goal of de-
scription to the second goal of explanation. In other words, "(c]onceptualization relates
both to the idea of categories for the sorting of items [(description)] and to the idea of
expectation, belief, or hypothesis as to how items will actually fit available categories
[(explanation)]; it links up with the notion of category and, also, with the quite different
notion of hypothesis." I. Scheffler, supra note 34, at 38 (emphasis in original).
37. This Note adopts Professor Dworkin's characterization of the sources of princi-
ples as a characterization of the sources of nonderivative principles. Limited to nonde-
rivative principles, therefore, Professor Dworkin's argument is accepted as valid: there
can be no rule of recognition for identifying nonderivative legal principles. Thus, if the
legal principles are not derived from the rules of the legal system, they cannot be identi-
fied in a manner consistent with positivism. See supra note 25-27 and accompanying
text.
38. See Thompson v. Leach, 1 Eng. Rep. 102 (1698).
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"it must be implied" and "the plaintiff must be deemed" or by such
adjectives as "constructive" or "implied-in-law." ' 39 Examples of the lat-
ter are the doctrines of attractive nuisance and of respondeat superior.
Pure monists cannot explain why, amidst almost universal oppro-
brium, 40 the legal fiction continues to exist. Pure monists hold that the
law is a system of rules, and that a rule either applies or does not apply.
Yet, in a case involving a legal fiction, a particular rule of law applies
even though the facts of the case are not the operative facts necessary
to establish the relevance of that particular rule of law. If pure monistic
positivism were the correct theory, the rule would be regarded as irrele-
vant and not applied. But the rule is regarded as relevant and it is
applied.
Pure monistic positivists cannot give an account of how a rule is
established as relevant even though the operative facts of the rule are
not present: Can an ordinary act of equestrian showmanship be fiction-
alized as an act of murder? If not, why can a pacifist felon be deemed
the murderer of a man killed by his co-conspirator? To these questions
positivists can offer only the nonanswer that the rule is simply relevant
because the judge decides it to be so. This is unsatisfactory for two
reasons. First, it suggests that judges have unbridled discretion to fic-
tionalize our lives and apply any rule they wish. As an empirical matter
this is false. Second, the nonanswer leaves shrouded in mystery pre-
cisely the issue it is required to illuminate. We know the judge has de-
cided the case in a specific way-the question is why.
Only by making a distinction between rules and principles can a
theory explain systemic operations such as the use of fictions in the law.
The use of legal fictions is determined in particular cases by an appeal
to principles. These principles determine when a certain rule is or is
not relevant, and dictate the appropriate use, if any, of legal fictions.
By including principles that supervene the operative facts of a particu-
lar rule, a legal theory can explain why that rule is considered relevant
to the facts of the case at bar and why its application is legitimate. The
39. Because it is not always clear how conscious courts are of the falsity of fictions, a
legal fiction can be defined as "either (1) a statement propounded with a complete or
partial consciousness of its falsity, or (2) a false statement recognized as having utility."
L. Fuller, Legal Fictions 9 (1967).
40. Jurists have long recognized legal fictions as problematic. Bentham described
them as "the most pernicious and basest sort of lying." 6 J. Bentham, Works 582
(Bowering ed. 1843). Rhetorically, he asked and answered his own question: "Fiction
of use to justice? Exactly as swindling is to trade." 7J. Bentham, Works 283 (Bowering
ed. 1843). Blackstone said that "while we may applaud the end, we cannot admire the
means." 3 W. Blackstone, Commentaries 360 (Lewis ed. 1897). Austin commented that
"I rather impute such fictions to the sheer imbecility (or, if you will, to the active and
sportive fancies) of their grave and venerable authors, than to any deliberate design,
good or evil." 2J. Austin, Lectures on Jurisprudence 611 (5th ed. 1885). Finally, Willis-
ton advised "[i]t is better to state the law in terms of reality, for misapprehension is sure
to be caused by fictions." 2 S. Williston, Contracts §§ 1576-77 (1920), quoted in L.
Fuller, supra note 39, at 4.
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rule is relevant because the principles require an extension of the scope
of the rule to that kind of case. The requirements of the principles
stand in for the operative facts of the rule. The application is legitimate
because the rule is applied in accord with the principles. Thus, the
legal fiction is a device which realigns the rules and principles within
the legal system when either the scope of the principles exceeds the
scope of the rules or the scope of the rules exceeds the scope of the
principles. 41
The development of the doctrine of respondeat superior provides
a good example ofjudicial expansion of the scope of a rule. During the
nineteenth century, the courts became committed to the principle that
employers should be liable for the harm caused by their employees in
performing the duties of their employment. The only rule available for
imposing liability, however, was the rule of negligence. The rule clearly
did not apply to nonnegligent employers. To extend the scope of the
rule to cover these cases and to meet the requirements of this new prin-
ciple, the court either deemed that the employers were negligent in hir-
ing careless employees or declared that the employers impliedly
commanded their employees to do all the acts that the employees did
while performing their duties. 42 Under either fiction, the rule of negli-
gence could be applied. The principle of strict liability thus supervened
what previously were the operative facts of the rule and established the
rule as relevant to the facts of these cases. The fiction extended the
scope of the rule to accord with the principle.
The development of the attractive nuisance doctrine, conversely,
was a judicial effort to avoid the application of a rule. Here, too, the
courts found it necessary to use a legal fiction. Prior to the attractive
nuisance doctrine, landowners were not liable to anyone who tres-
passed upon their land and was injured.43 The courts, however, be-
came committed to a principle that one who causes a foreseeable and
avoidable injury to a child should be liable for that injury. The old rule
prevented realization of this principle. To surmount this obstacle the
courts fictionalized an invitation by the landowner to the child to enter
upon the land. Since the child had been "invited," the old rule con-
cerning trespassers did not apply, and the principle could be realized
without impediment.44 Here, a contraction of the scope of a rule was
41. Cf. B. Cardozo, supra note 2, at 42-43 ("Such formulas are merely the remedial
devices by which a result conceived of as right and just is made to square with principle
and with the symmetry of the legal system.").
While the discussion has encompassed only common law fictions, this general analy-
sis is applicable to the statutory fictions of civil law jurisdictions as well. For an impor-
tant discussion of statutory fictions (Gesetzliche Fiktionen) in German law see K. Larenz,
Methodenlehre der Rechtswissenschaft 245-48 (1975).
42. See Wigmore, Responsibility for Tortious Acts, 7 Harv. L. Rev. 315, 383
(1894).
43. See Howland v. Vincent, 51 Mass. (10 Met.) 371 (1845).
44. Keffe v. Milwaukee & St. Paul Ry., 21 Minn. 207 (1875).
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required by a principle of the legal system. The contraction was legiti-
mate because it furthered the realization of this principle.45
Not only are pure monistic positivists unable to explain why a legal
fiction is used in the way it is used, they cannot explain why a legal
fiction is used in the first place. Pure monistic positivists might suggest
that legal fictions exist to disguise the legislative activity of the judge.
However, the question remains: Why disguise judicial legislation? If
judicial legislation is legitimate, the judge could simply state an ordi-
nary, nonfictional rule having the same legal consequences as the legal
fiction. To explain the existence of legal fictions as deceptions, the
pure monist must either claim that judicial legislation is illegitimate per
se and that the creation of a legal fiction is a form ofjudicial cheating,
or give reasons why a deceptive fiction is created when an ordinary rule
could be articulated specifying the change in the law with greater clarity
and candor. Allowing that the legislative activity of a judge is generally
legitimate, the existence of deceptive fictions can only be explained by
referring to a principle that provides a reason for their creation.46 Such
a principle might be that a judge should not be perceived as a legisla-
tor.47 There may be good reasons for the presence of this principle in a
system of law, such as a commitment to the separation of powers.
Whatever the reasons for the presence of such a procedural principle,
the point remains that the pure monist is finally forced to invoke one or
45. Pure monists may argue that doctrines such as respondeat superiour and attrac-
tive nuisance are simply new rules reflecting special operative facts. Even if this is con-
ceded, pure monists are still unable to explain the use of the legal fiction-as opposed
to the creation of a new rule-in the first instance. They are similarly unable to explain
why ajudge may resort to a fiction in one case but not in another. Cf. infra notes 46-47
and accompanying text (making analogous points with respect to the existence of legal
fictions).
46. This claim assumes that there is no express decision rule that requires the offi-
cials of the legal system to create legal fictions in order to deceive the general public.
Decision rules are laws addressed to the officials of the legal system to provide guide-
lines for their decisions. An example of a decision rule is a rule that requires under
certain circumstances a judge to sentence a defendant to a prison term of not less that
five years but not greater than ten years. Decision rules are contrasted with conduct
rules. Conduct rules are laws addressed to the general public to provide guidelines for
their conduct. For a detailed discussion of this distinction see Dan-Cohen, Decision
Rules and Conduct Rules: On Acoustic Separation in Criminal Law, 97 Harv. L. Rev.
625 (1984).
47. By analogy to Professor Dan-Cohen's distinction between decision rules and
conduct rules, one might call this principle-that a judge should not be perceived as a
legislator-a decision principle. Clearly, if such a principle exists in a legal system, it is a
principle directed at the officials. Moreover, if it is to be effective, only the officials
should be aware of its existence. This latter point suggests that an acoustic separation
may occur at the level of principles in a legal system, that is, that some of the principles
of a legal system are meant only to be "heard" by the officials but not the general public
while others are meant to be "heard" by the general public but not the officials qua
officials. For a more detailed discussion of acoustic separation see Dan-Cohen, supra
note 46, at 630-34.
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more principles to explain the existence of legal fictions within a legal
system.
A recognition of legal principles provides more ordinary proce-
dural explanations for the existence of legal fictions as well. One of the
many reasons why fictions might be used is that a judge may simply
"not know how else to state and explain the new principle he is apply-
ing."'48 Moreover, from a systemic perspective, while "[t]he purpose of
the fiction consists in making lighter the difficulties connected with the
assimilation and elaboration of new, more or less revolutionary, legal
principles,"' 49 it also consists "in making it possible to leave the tradi-
tional learning in its old form, yet without hindering thereby the practi-
cal efficiency of the new in any way . . .50
B. Legal Phenomena and the Limitations of Monistic Theory
Legal monism cannot describe, explain, and account for the possi-
bility of all legal phenomena. Pure monism cannot do so for adverse
possession because its limitation to an analysis in terms of rules pre-
vents it from developing an adequate narrative structure.5 1 Mixed
monism cannot account for adverse possession because its principles
are not capable of justifying rules and acts.
1. The Limitations of Pure Monistic Positivism. - Pure monistic positiv-
ism, committed to the proposition that every legal phenomenon can be
explained in terms of the application of a single rule, seeks to explain
each legal phenomenon in the same manner.52 First, certain operative
48. L. Fuller, supra note 39, at 64.
49. Id. at 61 (quoting and translating 3 Ihering, Geist des rbmischen Rechts
301-06 (6th ed. 1923)).
50. Id. at 61-62.
51. See infra note 53. In light of Professor Dworkin's extensive writings on the use
of principles by judges in the ordinary course of their activity, one might question the
need for an argument against the adequacy of pure monistic positivism. However, pre-
cisely because Professor Dworkin offers only a descriptive account of a judge's use of
principles, the pure monist may respond by giving a reductivist model of rules allegedly
showing what is "really" going on. To prevent this response an argument is needed
which shows that a pure monistic model, given the logic of rules, cannot succeed as an
adequate legal theory. This is accomplished by moving beyond descriptive observa-
tions, like those of Professor Dworkin, to a consideration of the narrative structure in-
herent in a pure monistic model. See infra notes 53-57 and accompanying text.
52. Recall that a legal phenomenon is any act, event, or relation imbued with legal
significance by the legal culture. Thus, for example, the existence of a contract and of a
breach of that contract constitute two distinct legal phenomena. The existence of a rela-
tion of contract and of an act of breach must be determined separately within the legal
system. Of course, the existence of one legal phenomenon may be relevant to determin-
ing the existence of another legal phenomenon: the existence of a contract is relevant to
determining whether a particular act is a breach of contract. This relationship, however,
does not prevent them from being distinct legal phenomena: the existence of a contract
is simply another fact in the world that must be considered in determining the existence
of a breach. Only when the legal phenomenon relevant to determining the existence of
a subsequent legal phenomenon cannot coexist consistently with this subsequent phe-
[Vol. 86:823
DUALISTIC THEORY
facts occur. Second, these operative facts demonstrate the relevance of
a particular rule of law. Third, the relevant rule of law is applied and
imposes upon these facts a particular legal meaning. These facts to-
gether with their legal meaning constitute the legal phenomenon. This
analysis shapes the narrative structure of monistic legal discourse. 53 A
story is told: fact and episode build upon fact and episode. These facts
and episodes have no legal significance; they merely describe what hap-
pened. Ultimately, the story climaxes as a rule of law is established as
applicable and concludes in the creation of the monistic legal phenom-
enon. Employing this narrative structure, monistic lawyers impose
legal significance or meaning only at the end and not at the beginning
or middle of the story.
The narrative structure of pure monistic positivism adequately de-
scribes many legal phenomena, such as the doctrine of consideration in
contract law. Under this doctrinal rule, a contract is generally not
formed until each party has given the other some form of consideration
for which the other has bargained. Because not every bargained for
exchange of promises and perfomances meets the requirements of con-
sideration, this simple doctrine quickly becomes a complex rule.
5 4
Nonetheless, it is a rule stipulating when a particular event may be im-
bued with a special legal significance. When the rule applies, a monistic
legal phenomenon is created. Williston offers to deliver a lengthy man-
uscript by Corbin to West Publishing Company if only Corbin will give
to him the original peppercorn that has recently come into Corbin's
possession. Corbin gives the peppercorn to Williston in return for his
promise to deliver the manuscript. Up to this point, the story has de-
scribed only the events of their lives. But now the story climaxes as a
rule of law applies. As Williston stops to peruse the manuscript on his
way to West, he realizes, much to his chagrin, that he is under a con-
tractual obligation to proceed.
Some legal phenomena, however, cannot be viewed as the creation
of a single rule. In addition, the narrative description of some legal
nomenon is their distinctness from one another to be questioned; this is the case with a
dualistic phenomenon. See infra notes 55-57, 75-102 and accompanying text.
53. A narrative structure is the structure of a narrative description. A narrative de-
scription, in turn, describes the internal structure of a legal phenomenon. It may de-
scribe the internal structure of a legal phenomenon directly or it may describe a
nonlegal structure that becomes a legal structure upon the application of a rule. This
latter case is exemplified by the transformation of negotiation into contract upon apply-
ing the rule of consideration. The class of narrative structures of a particular legal dis-
course defines the set of possible narrative descriptions within that discourse. This set,
in turn, determines the legal phenomena that may be described within that discourse.
Since monistic legal discourse only permits one kind of narrative structure, what is true
of this narrative structure is true of monistic narrative descriptions generally.
54. The doctrine of consideration encompasses such disparate topics as prior legal
duties, doubtful and invalid claims, multiple exchanges, conditional, illusory and alter-
native promises, as well as voidable and unenforceable promises. See Restatement (Sec-
ond) of Contracts §§ 71-80.
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phenomena must impose legal significance upon an act, event, or rela-
tion that occurs prior to the end of the narration. Therefore, the narra-
tive structure of pure monistic positivism cannot explain all legal
phenomena.
Adverse possession, for example, involves two rules: the rule
against trespass and the rule that bars the remedy of a disseised owner
in an action for ejectment.55 This establishes from the start that ad-
verse possession cannot be viewed as the creation of a single rule or,
equivalently, as a monistic legal phenomenon. Moreover, this legal
phenomenon requires that legal significance be imposed at the begin-
ning of the narrative as well as at the end. At the beginning of the
narrative description of adverse possession, the adverse claimant is
given the legal significance of a trespasser; he has illegally entered
upon the land of another. By the end of the narrative, however, the
remedy of the disseised owner is barred and the relation of the dis-
seisor to the land is imbued with the legal meaning of ownership. The
adverse claimant is then the legal owner of the land under a newly cre-
ated title.56
The description of adverse possession cannot be fit within the sin-
gle narrative structure of pure monistic legal discourse. The only time
at which pure monistic narrators can attribute legal significance is at the
conclusion of a narrative. Pure monists, therefore, are forced to tell
two different stories: the story of the trespasser and the story of the
owner. These two narratives conflict and an ambiguity is created: is
the possessor an illegal trespasser or the legal owner? This ambiguity
becomes especially pronounced once the doctrine of "relation back" is
introduced. Under this doctrine, the title received by the successful ad-
verse claimant "relates back to the time of his entry; hence he was the
owner all the time, and violated no rights of other people in treating
the land as he did."'57 This ambiguity cannot be resolved simply by
choosing one narrative as authoritative. To choose one narrative and
exclude the other would be to destroy the concept of adverse posses-
sion. Adverse possession requires that the legal significance imposed at
the conclusion of each of these pure monistic narratives be preserved
within a single, continuous narrative. A single, continuous narrative,
however, cannot be achieved within a pure monistic model because the
operative facts of both rules have obtained, each rule applies, and two
conflicting narratives result. Only by reconceptualizing the origin of
the legal significance imposed on the acts of the adverse possessor can
this ambiguity be resolved and the story of adverse possession be told
as a single, continuous narrative without contradiction.
55. Cf. 7 Powell, The Law of Real Property 1012[2] (1984) (describing adverse
possession as barring the remedy in an action for ejectment).
56. See R. Cunningham, W. Stoebuck & D. Whitman, The Law of Property 758
(1984) [hereinafter cited as Cunningham].
57. C. Callahan, Adverse Possession 58-59 (1961).
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2. The Limitations of Mixed Monism. - Unlike pure monistic posi-
tivists, mixed monists include principles in their description and expla-
nation of legal phenomena. In order to describe and explain the
transformation of the adverse possessor from trespasser to legal owner,
however, the principles deployed must justify the acts of the adverse
claimant. The derivative principles of mixed monism cannot do this.
Rather, its principles simply describe the way in which the rule of ad-
verse possession coheres with the other rules of the legal system.
In seeking to describe adverse possession, mixed monists might
first cite the two rules of trespass and adverse possession. 58 Mixed mo-
nists would then add to this pure monistic analysis a set of principles
derived through a "Herculean" synthesis of all the other existing legal
rules.59 Finally, mixed monists would seek to describe and explain the
transformation of the adverse claimant from trespasser to owner by de-
ploying this set of principles.
While the use of principles is necessary to achieve a single, contin-
uous narrative of adverse possession, the narrative structure of adverse
possession must permit principles to impose legal significance directly
upon the acts of the adverse claimant. This imposition is necessary be-
cause the acts of the adverse claimant must carry some type of legal
significance in order to create a legally significant link with which to
connect the illegality of his trespassory acts and the legality of his acts
as owner.60 Unless the principles justify a change in the legal status of
these acts, the transformation of the adverse possessor from trespasser
to legal owner is not possible.
Recognizing this requirement for a single, continuous narrative,
mixed monists might claim that the principles derived from the existing
law apply directly to the acts of the adverse claimant and thereby justify
the transformation of the adverse claimant from illegal trespasser into
legal owner. This is possible, however, only if the derived principles
also justify the rule of adverse possession. This is because a principle
justifies an act, all else being equal, if and only if it justifies the rule to
the extent that the act falls within its scope.6 1 If the principles of mixed
58. These rules, standing alone, however, cannot describe and explain this legal
phenomenon. Nor can the mixed monists appeal to some other rule as supported by
their derivative principles. Applying rules will generate more incompatible narratives.
See supra notes 55-57 and accompanying text.
59. See supra notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
60. See infra note 61 and accompanying text.
61. The classic instance of this equivalence is the proof that rule utilitarianism is
equivalent to act utilitarianism. See D. Lyons, The Forms and Limits of Utilitarianism
133, 143-44, 186-87 (1965). Consider either the principle of utility or the principle of
self-defense. If either principle justifies the rule of self-defense, then one would say that
the principle justifies an act of self-defense as well. The converse is also true. The
equivalence thesis has recently come under attack, see D. Regan, Utilitarianism and Co-
operation 18-19, 99-100 (1980), but at least one scholar argues persuasively that this
attack is a failure. J. Fishkin, The Limits of Obligation 174-75 (1982). A full discussion
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monism do not justify the rule of adverse possession, then its principles
do not justify the acts of the adverse claimant and cannot supply the
justification necessary for a single, continuous narrative of adverse
possession.
The derived principles deployed by mixed monists do not them-
selves justify the rule of adverse possession. Mixed monism embraces a
coherence theory of justification.62 In a legal context, this theory
amounts to the claim that a rule is justified as a rule of law63 if it fits
sufficiently well-that is, coheres-with the otherwise existing law. 64
of this attack is beyond the scope of this Note. Notwithstanding this recent attack, how-
ever, this Note assumes the equivalence thesis is defensible along the lines of Professor
Fishkin, id.
62. See R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 44, 283, 340-42, 360; N. MacCormick, supra
note 5, chs. 5, 7; Kress, Legal Reasoning and Coherence Theories: Dworkin's Rights
Thesis, Retroactivity, and the Linear Order of Decisions, 72 Calif. L. Rev. 369 (1984).
Most generally, a coherence theory ofjustification holds that a proposition is justi-
fied if it fits sufficiently well with other propositions held to be justified. See K. Lehrer,
Knowledge 154, 165 (1974); cf. N. Rescher, The Coherence Theory of Truth 32, 43-44
(1973) (discussing a coherence theory of truth, not justification).
63. It may be preferable to speak of a rule beingjustified "as a possible rule of law"
rather than "as a rule of law." When ajudge articulates a set of principles that rational-
izes the existing law with some rule, "[h]e does not thereby show that the decision must
be as he proposes to give it in the instant case; only that it may be legitimately so given."
N. MacCormick, supra note 5, at 126. Moreover, the former phrase makes clear that this
Note takes no position with respect to the validity of the "right answer thesis." See
Dworkin, No Right Answer? in Law, Morality, and Society 58-84 (1979). If the "strong
right answer thesis"-that necessarily in every hard case one and only one of the parties
has a legal right to win-is true, then there is always only one possible rule of law that is
justified. If the "weak right answer thesis"-that possibly there exists a hard case in
which one and only one of the parties has a legal right to win-is true, then it is possible
that only one possible rule of law is justified. See Galis, The Real and Unrefuted Rights
Thesis, 92 Phil. Rev. 197, 218 (1983). If, however, both versions of the "right answer
thesis" are false, then there will always be more than one possible rule of law that is
justified.
64. Cf. K. Lehrer, supra note 62, at 154 (Noting that the body of propositions, with
which the proposed proposition must cohere, must have some special property k. In a
legal context, this property k is "being the existing law.").
Coherence with the existing law is necessary, on a monistic view, because "judges
are to do justice according to law. . . .[Elvery decision, however acceptable or desira-
ble on ... [other] ... grounds, must also be warranted by the law as it is." N.
MacCormick, supra note 5, at 107. Thus, the fact that the rule hangs together with the
existing law sufficiently well to constitute a coherent whole justifies the rule. Not all
mixed monists have recognized this implication of their position. Compare id. (recog-
nizing this implication) with R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 283, 340-42 (apparently not
recognizing this implication). See also Coleman, supra note 28, at 163 n.15 (recogniz-
ing that this implication is one that follows from Professor Dworkin's theory).
On this model, however, as the rules of the legal system change, an adopted rule
may lose its coherence with the remaining existing law and thereby its justification to be
a rule of law. Cf. Cornman, Foundational versus Nonfoundational Theories of Empiri-
calJustification in Knowledge andJustification 229, 235, 241-42 (G. Pappas & M. Swain
eds. 1978) (relativizing the coherence to a moment of time); R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at
119-21 (allowing that a rule may be disregarded as a mistake even though it was once
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All the set of derived principles does is to demonstrate that the rule of
adverse possession coheres with the other rules of the legal system by
describing the nature of that coherence. 65 This description of the justifi-
cation of the rule of adverse possession plays a crucial role in making
the rule of adverse possession a part of the legal system. By articulating
a set of principles that rationalize the existing law with the rule of ad-
verse possession, mixed monists describe the coherence, thereby show-
ing that the rule is justified.66
Describing the justification of a rule, however, is not itself justifica-
tion. The rule of adverse possession is justified because it coheres with
the other legal rules, not because derived principles are invoked that
show that it coheres. In claiming that their principles justify the acts of
the adverse claimant, mixed monists have conflated the justifying func-
tion of coherence with the description of coherence. Because the de-
rived principles invoked by mixed monists do not justify the rule of
adverse possession, these principles cannot justify the acts of the ad-
verse claimant. Therefore, mixed monists are unable to describe and
explain the transformation of the adverse possessor from trespasser to
legal owner.
That the principles of the mixed monist are descriptive rather than
justificatory is further demonstrated by recognizing that the justifica-
tion of a rule as a rule of law is independent of the set of principles
articulated to rationalize the existing law with other rules. This may be
demonstrated by hypothesizing that, at common law, the courts had not
adopted a rule governing the status of a trespasser who occupies land
under a claim of right. 67 Suppose, further, that a present-day court
wishes to adopt the rule of adverse possession and that the court, look-
ing at the currently accepted set of principles, discovers that these prin-
ciples cannot rationalize the proposed rule of adverse possession with
the existing body of rules. Mixed monists concede that the court may
adopt the proposed adverse possession rule provided that the rule co-
heres with the rest of the rules of the legal system and that this coher-
ence can be demonstrated. The fact that the set of principles that
rationalizes the rule of adverse possession with the existing law had
regarded as valid). How one determines that it is the older rule that is no longer justi-
fied and not the newer rules, whose addition caused the failure of coherence between all
the rules of the system, is a problem for this account.
65. Cf. Coleman, supra note 28, at 164 n.15 (Professor Dworkin's "argument that
the best theory of law is a moral theory because it consists in a set of moral principles
fails primarily because the principles which constitute the best theory do not do so be-
cause they are true, but because they best systemize the existing law.").
66. See N. MacCormick, supra note 5, at 107 ("To the extent that existing detailed
rules [i.e., the existing law] are or can be rationalized in terms of more general princi-
ples, principles whose tenor goes beyond the ambit of already settled rules, a sufficient
and sufficiently legal warrant exists to justify as a legal decision some novel ruling
.") (emphasis in original).
67. See infra note 80.
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never been articulated would not be a bar.6 8
Mixed monists cannot claim that their principles arejustificatory by
arguing that it is the existing law together with their principles that jus-
tify the rule of adverse possession. In effect, the set of principles
adopted by mixed monists operates as a rule of inference. The existing
law is the premise, the rule is the conclusion, and the set of principles
permits the inference from the one to the other by demonstrating the
existence of a relation of coherence between them.69 To argue that the
derived principles together with the existing law justify adverse posses-
sion is merely to adopt a rule of inference as another premise. Such a
maneuver is purely semantic.
Mixed monists might attempt to avoid the conclusion that their
principles cannot justify the acts of the adverse claimant by arguing that
while their principles do not justify acts, they can describe the justifica-
tion of acts by rationalizing these acts with the existing law. This con-
tention, however, is without merit. A rule is justified as a rule of law
because it coheres with other legal rules. Only propositions can cohere
with one another. To claim that an act is justified by its coherence with
a set of rules involves a category mistake. 70 Acts do not cohere with
rules, they fall within or without their scope.
Nor will it do to claim that an act is justified because it falls within
the scope of a rule-for example, the rule of adverse possession-that
is justified by its coherence with the otherwise existing law. This would
68. On the mixed monistic adjudicatory model, when judges wish to introduce a
novel rule that cannot be rationalized with the existing law by the currently accepted set
of principles, they must articulate a new set of principles that does rationalize the new
rule with the existing rule. In doing this, judges "rationalize[] the existing law so as to
reveal it in the light of a new understanding," N. MacCormick, supra note 5, at 126, by
which it is seen to cohere with the novel rule. Ajudge "does not simply find and state
the rationale of the rules," id., but "to a greater or less degree, he makes them rational
by stating a principle [or set of principles] capable of embracing them." Id. In this fash-
ion, the judge rationalizes the existing law with the novel rule "which can now be repre-
sented as one already 'covered' by 'existing' law." Id. Implicit in this account are three
claims: first, that more than one set of principles may rationalize the existing law; sec-
ond, that it is possible that not every set of principles will rationalize the same novel
rule; and, third, that a rule is justified as a rule of law if and only if at least one set of
principles exists that rationalizes it with the existing law. The conclusion in the text
follows immediately from these three claims as premises.
69. The analogy to logic is instructive. In a logical proof it is the truth of the prem-
ises that justifies the ascription of truth to the conclusion. The logical rule of inference
merely describes a truth-preserving relation that exists between the premises and the
conclusion. Moreover, it is often the case that one may reason to the same conclusion
using a variety of different rules of inference. This does not mean that, taking the prem-
ises to be true, the conclusion has a different source ofjustification in each case, but only
that there are different ways of demonstrating that the conclusion is justified. Further-
more, a conclusion may be justified as true because it follows from a given set of prem-
ises even though no one has ever logically proven it.
70. See generally G. Ryle, The Concept of Mind 16-18 (1949) (defining the con-
cept of category mistake).
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be tojustify the acts of the adverse claimant by an appeal to the rules of
the existing law, including the rule against trespass, and would lead to
the reemergence of the problem of dual narratives since the operative
facts of both the rule against trespass and the rule of adverse posses-
sion obtain.7 ' This problem is especially pernicious for the mixed mo-
nists since it indicates that the two rules do not cohere-each rule
results in a conclusion incompatible with the other. Thus, the assump-
tion that the two rules cohere leads to the conclusion that the two rules
do not cohere, thereby reducing to absurdity the assumption necessary
for this response.
The mixed monist might attempt to avoid this reductio by claiming
that the coherence between these two rules is more complex than previ-
ously allowed and thus prevents the problem of dual narratives. In es-
sence, the mixed monist might claim that the principles that describe
the coherence are weighted in such a fashion that the rule against tres-
pass applies to certain situations to which the rule of adverse posses-
sion does not apply and vice versa. But to index these two rules to
different types of situations-for instance, different lengths of occupa-
tion by an adverse possessor-is tantamount to applying the principles
to the acts within these situations thereby justifying their legal status.
The principles of the mixed monist, however, are not justificatory.
They are descriptive and, therefore, this attempt to avoid the reductio
cannot succeed. 72
Even if, arguendo, this response could be maintained, a mixed mo-
nistic andlysis would still fail to meet the condition of explanatory ade-
quacy.73 A legal theory, to be adequate, must be able to explain why a
rule is created and adopted as law as well as why certain kinds of acts
are given legal significance while others are not. Mixed monists can
answer neither of these questions from within the normative structure
of a legal system; they can offer only an ex post rationalization of the
legitimacy of a rule and its application. In contrast, a legal theory that
embraces nonderivative, justificatory principles can answer both of
these questions from within the normative structure of a legal system.
The legal significance of a particular act can be explained by the act's
71. See supra note 57 and accompanying text.
72. Nor is the claim that the principles of the mixed monist are descriptive defeated
by an alternate understanding of Professor Dworkin's mixed monistic theory. Professor
Dworkin at times seems to claim that the set of derived principles that should be
adopted is the set, among all the sets of principles that rationalize the existing law, that
best satisfies some other nonderived principle such as a substantive principle of distribu-
tivejustice. See R. Dworkin, supra note 8, at 126; Dworkin, "Natural" Law Revisited, 34
U. Fla. L. Rev. 165, 165-66, 171 (1982); Galis, supra note 63, at 206-09. Under this
reading of Professor Dworkin's work, the set of principles merely describes the coher-
ence of the rule together with the existing law and the additional nonderived principle.
Thus, even under this reading, the derived principles are not justificatory.
73. For the three conditions of adequacy on a legal theory see supra notes 34-36
and accompanying text.
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relation to the nonderivative principles of the legal system. In addition,
the creation and adoption of a particular rule governing such an act is
conditioned on that rule's encapsulation of the relation between this
type of act and the nonderivative legal principles. The rule devolves
from the act that is justified by principles.74
III. LEGAL DUALISM AND THE STRUCTURE OF DUALISTIC
LEGAL PHENOMENA
A legal system can be understood adequately only through the ap-
plication of a dualistic theory. A dualistic conception holds that a legal
system is composed of both rules and principles, that neither is depen-
dent for its existence on the existence of the other, and that the absence
of either one prevents an adequate understanding of the legal system as
a whole. In particular, legal dualism holds that all systemic operations
and legal phenomena can be described, explained, and shown possible
by reference to rules or principles or both. Moreover, legal dualism
holds that legal principles justify legal rules; they do not merely de-
scribe the coherence between the existing law and a novel rule. This
additional property of principles on a dualistic account permits legal
dualism to recognize dualistic legal phenomena whose structure is too
complex to be cognized within monistic theory.
Dualistic legal phenomena are those legal phenomena whose de-
scription, explanation, and ontic possibility can be accounted for only
by first distinguishing within the legal system between rules and nonde-
rivative principles. A dualistic legal phenomenon cannot be viewed as
the creation of a single rule. Its narrative description must impose legal
significance both before and at the end of its narrative. The internal
structure of a dualistic phenomenon is dynamic and can be described
only by reference to more than a single moment of time. 75
The essential trait of a dualistic legal phenomenon is the dynamic
structural transformation of the legal status of some person, act, or
event. This structural transformation contains three essential mo-
ments: the moments of formal illegality, problematic illegality, and
74. Even if one employed a weaker standard of explanatory adequacy it would still
be true that a theory embracing nonderivative principles had a greater explanatory
power, see supra note 35, than a mixed monistic theory and, in this respect at least, is to
be preferred.
75. The contrast between monistic and dualistic legal phenomena may be further
heightened by noting that our legal culture does not symbolize the diachronic structure
of a dualistic legal phenomenon with a writing such as a certificate of title given to a
successful adverse possessor, while our legal culture does often symbolize the syn-
chronic structure of a monistic legal phenomenon with such a writing. Often someone is
heard saying, while pointing to a writing, "Here is a contract," but no one is ever heard
saying, while pointing to a certificate of a newly created title, "Here is an adverse posses-
sion." Adverse possession cannot be collapsed into a single moment without losing its
transformational character. Through neither metonymy nor synecdoche can a legal cul-
ture represent a dynamic structure with an inert document.
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legal illegality.76 In the moment of formal illegality, an actor within the
dualistic narrative has completed some act that is formally proscribed
by the legal system. A monistic legal phenomenon is created; a rule has
applied that designates the act as illegal. At some point later in the
narrative, the actor challenges his illegal status. He acts under a claim
of right 77 and appeals to principles that justify his acts and, therefore,
the ascription of this right to him. At this point he raises the question
of his illegal status as a question of principle and problematizes his
characterization as illegal. This is the transformational moment of
problematic illegality. The passage from problematic illegality to legal
illegality is effected when the officials of the legal system determine that
the principles of the system justify the actor's conduct and, therefore,
his claim of right. When this structural transformation is complete, the
application of the formal rules of the system is modified to realign its
result with that required by the principles to which the legal culture is
committed. This is the moment of legal illegality.
A. Principles and Rules
Monistic theory in general and positivism in particular can neither
describe nor explain certain legal phenomena such as adverse posses-
sion 78 and the good faith purchaser for value. These legal phenomena
require a dualistic theory for their description and explanation.
Under the action of adverse possession, if a trespasser acts under a
claim of right for the prescribed statutory period, he is transformed
retroactively into the legal owner.79 This phenomenon can be de-
scribed and explained as a dualistic structural transformation. First,
there is an act of trespass. Second, the trespassory possession is contin-
ued under a claim of right for the prescribed statutory period. Third, a
newly created title is awarded to the trespasser.
The first transformational moment, the moment of formal illegality,
follows the narrative structure of monistic legal discourse. The exis-
tence of a formal rule makes the act of the adverse claimant illegal. The
adverse claimant, without permission or legal right, crosses a boundary
line onto the property of another. These operative facts of the rule
against trespass establish this rule as relevant. The rule applies and
imbues the act of the adverse claimant with the legal meaning of
trespass.
76. See infra note 84.
77. See infra note 80.
78. See supra notes 55-72 and accompanying text.
79. "To establish title by adverse possession, a claimant must demonstrate actual,
open and notorious, exclusive, continuous and hostile possession of the premises for the
prescribed statutory period under a claim of right or color of title." Powell, supra note
55, at 1013[l]. Since color of title is only a special basis for a claim of right and is not
required in all jurisdictions, this Note will not consider this element of the definition. It
is, however, integrable with the approach offered.
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With the act of trespass completed, the adverse claimant begins his
occupation of the land under a claim of right.80 He assumes the pos-
ture of the legal owner toward the land, thereby creating the moment
of problematic illegality. In acting as the owner, he rejects his formal ille-
gal status as a trespasser. Only by understanding the rejection of his
trespassory status as an appeal to the values and principles that sur-
round and inhere in our concept of ownership can the proprietary be-
havior of the adverse claimant be understood as constituting a claim of
right.81 Through an appeal to the principles that support the presence
of ownership in our society, the adverse claimant rejects the characteri-
zation of his acts as the act of a trespasser. The adverse claimant af-
80. For the adverse claimant to act under a claim of right is for him to act as if he
were the owner. Occupation under a claim of right is the central and most important
requirement to establishing title by adverse possession. The words "a claim of right"
are not a separate substantive requirement of adverse possession. Cf. Callahan, supra
note 57, at 67 (the words "add nothing"). The phrase functions, rather, as a summary of
the five other requirements concerning the character of the possession. Each of the five
requirements characterizes one aspect of proprietary behavior. The requirement that
the possession of the land be actual requires the degree of physical occupation with
which an owner would occupy his land. Cunningham, supra note 56, at 759. The re-
quirement that the possession be open and notorious requires that the acts of the adverse
claimant upon the surface of the land be visible to the community in the manner in
which an owner's acts would be. Id. at 760; Powell, supra note 55, at T 1013[2][b]. The
requirement that possession be exclusive requires "a type of possession which would
characterize an owner's use." Id. at 1013[2][d]. The requirement that the possession
be continuous requires that "the [adverse] claimant exercise[] palpable and continuing
acts of ownership [over the land] for the duration of the statutory period." Id. at
TV 1013[2][e], 1013[2][i][c]; see Cunningham, supra note 56, at 763. These four re-
quirements concern concrete, observable properties necessary to make the overt behav-
ior of the adverse possessor proprietary.
In contrast, the requirement of hostility concerns the absence of an abstract legal
quality-permission. Powell, supra note 55, at T 1013[2]. This requirement most
clearly demands that the adverse claimant act as if he were the owner. An owner does
not need permission to occupy his land and hostility means "nothing more than that
[the occupation] is without permission of the one legally empowered to give permis-
sion." Cunningham, supra note 56, at 760. If one seeks permission to occupy the land,
then, no matter what other proprietary qualities one's acts evidence, one is clearly not
acting as if he were the owner. Nonhostility, therefore, functions as a defeasibility con-
dition on a claim of right. Powell, supra note 55, at 1013[2][e]; cf. H.L.A. Hart, The
Ascription of Responsibility and Rights, Proc. of the Aristotelian Soc'y, 49 (1948-49)
(general discussion of defeasibility conditions in the law), reprinted in Logic and Lan-
guage 145 (Flew ed. 1st series 1960). That nonhostility is a defeasibility condition is
made even more obvious by the existence of a presumption of hostility, and hence a
claim of right, once the first four requirements are met. Powell, supra note 55, at T
1013[1]. Recognizing nonhostility as a defeasibility condition underscores the character
of hostility as the absence of an abstract legal quality in contradistinction to the con-
crete, observable properties of the other four requirements.
81. The adverse claimant cannot be understood as basing his rejection on the rule
against trespass. The operative facts of this rule have occurred and the rule has applied.
Nor can the adverse claimant be understood as appealing to the rule of adverse posses-
sion to justify his rejection of his status as trespasser. This rule is not relevant until he
has already acted under a claim of right for the prescribed statutory period.
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firms in counterpoint that his acts are justified as the acts of the owner
and that they must be recognized as such if the principles of private
property and ownership are to be consistently maintained.
8 2
The adverse claimant articulates the question of his legal status as
a question of principle. By assuming the posture of a proprietor, the
adverse claimant brings into conflict the principles of ownership with the
formal rules that govern it. This invocation of principles, and the con-
flict it engenders, renders problematic the legal status of the adverse
claimant: under the legal norms of our society, he is a trespasser, but
under the principles that support those legal forms, he ought to be con-
strued as the rightful owner.
Of course, there are other principles besides the principles of land
ownership that the courts must weigh in the balance before they can
resolve the problematic status of the adverse claimant; principles of
fairness and of social stability must be considered as well. Awarding
title to the adverse claimant before the original owner has a chance to
disseise the disseisor or to argue his own case for retaining ownership
would be unfair to the original owner.83 Moreover, it would greatly
destabilize our legal culture if members of the public believed that they
could not rely on the legal forms of our society. To accommodate
these competing principles, the officials of the legal system require the
adverse claimant to occupy the land for a prescribed statutory period.
The final transformational moment, the moment of legal illegality,
84
is achieved when the officials of the legal system resolve the problem-
atic status of the adverse claimant. This resolution must be a principled
one because, by acting under a claim of right, the adverse claimant has
posed the question of his status as a question of principle. Thus, the
officials of the legal system must decide whether extinguishing his claim
of right would contravene the basic principles of property ownership.
They must determine whether the right the adverse claimant asserts is
what we mean within our legal culture by the right of ownership. They
do this by focusing upon the proprietary character of the adverse claim-
ant's behavior: was the possession sufficiently actual, notorious, exclu-
sive, continuous, and hostile? That is, were his acts justified by the
principles of ownership? If the officials decide that the adverse claim-
82. Such principles might be commitments to promoting the efficient use of land
and its free transferability in the marketplace. These commitments may in turn lead to
others such as stabilizing uncertain boundaries and quieting uncertain tides.
83. Callahan, supra note 57, at 89. The length of the statutory period in a particu-
lar jurisdiction is a function of the weight that the jurisdiction gives to these competing
principles. Accordingly, some jurisdictions require a period of as long as thirty years,
while others require a period of five. Compare La. Civ. Code Ann. art. 3499 (1961) (30
yrs.) with Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 318, 322 (1962) (5 yrs.)
84. Professor Ackerman has used the phrase "legal illegality" to describe the le-
gally anomolous character of adverse possession. See 1 B. Ackerman, Discovering the
Constitution, ch. 5, 30-35 (Summer, 1985) (Forthcoming 1987) [on file at the Columbia
Law Review].
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ant's behavior was not sufficiently proprietary, then his status will be
resolved as that of a trespasser. If, however, they decide that his behav-
ior during the statutory period was sufficiently like that of an owner,
then he will be deemed the legal owner and granted a newly created
title. This title will relate back to the original act of trespass with the
result that he will have never been a trespasser.8 5 In effect, this legal-
izes his earlier formal illegality. The application of the formal rules is
modified in order to realign them with the principles to which our legal
culture is committed.
Adverse possession is not the only dualistic phenomenon in our
legal system. Another is the good faith purchaser for value. The Uni-
form Commercial Code provides that a "purchaser of goods acquires
all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer ....
However, a "person with voidable tide," such as a person who has ac-
quired goods by criminally defrauding the original owner, "has power
to transfer a good title to a good faith purchaser for value."'87 Like
adverse possession,"8 the legal phenomenon of the good faith pur-
chaser for value involves a structural transformation: the voidable title
of the "bad faith" seller is transformed into a good title through its sale
to the good faith purchaser. Equivalently, the transformation may be
described as transforming an illegal transaction into a legal one.89
85. This is why the rule of adverse possession is often characterized as barring the
remedy of the disseised owner in an action for ejectment. Moreover, this analysis pro-
vides an answer to the question posed by one scholar: "How can a statute which merely
purports to bar the remedy of a plaintiff give title to a defendant?" Callahan, supra note
57, at 53. It is because the title is transferred that the remedy is barred-a much less
mysterious causation.
86. U.C.C. § 2-403(1).
87. Id. The Code identifies four situations in which the seller acquires voidable
title from the original owner: when an intermediate seller acquires the goods by deceiv-
ing the original owner as to his identity, U.C.C. § 2-403(l)(a); when the seller receives
delivery in exchange for a "bad check," id. at § 2-403(l)(b); when the seller bought the
goods under a "cash sale," but did not in fact pay for them, id. at § 2-403(l)(c); and
when "the delivery was procured [by the seller] through fraud punishable as larcenous
under the criminal law." Id. at § 2-403(1)(d).
A purchaser for value is basically any purchaser except a donee. Summers & White,
The Uniform Commercial Code § 3-11, at 140-41 (1980). Generally, a person is a good
faith purchaser if he "has neither knowledge nor reason to know that there is any title or
security claim" on the goods he is buying. 1 Anderson, Uniform Commercial Code § I-
201:38 (1982); see Cooper v. Pacific Auto Ins. Co., 95 Nev. 798, 801-02, 603 P.2d 281,
283 (1979) (A person who, on a Friday night at a bar, purchases an automobile from a
seller for less than that seller had paid for it, had a reason to know that there might be a
claim upon the car and is not, therefore, a good faith purchaser). The amount of value
requested by the seller, however, if sufficiently small relative to the worth of the goods,
may provide the purchaser with reason to know that the original owner's rights are be-
ing infringed and hence prevent the purchaser from buying in good faith. See Graves
Motors, Inc. v. Docar Sales, Inc., 414 F. Supp. 717, 719-20 (E.D. La. 1976); Hollis v.
Chamberlin, 243 Ark. 201, 205-06, 419 S.W.2d 116, 118-19 (1967).
88. See supra notes 78-85 and accompanying text.
89. That the provision of the U.C.C. is written in terms of the good faith purchaser
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The operation of the transformation is much like the internal struc-
ture of adverse possession. The moment of formal illegality is the at-
tempt of the seller to illegally sell the goods that he has acquired in a
manner that gives him voidable title. The seller acts under a claim of
right: he acts as the owner of the goods who has the power to transfer
full title to the purchaser. 90 The seller thereby invokes a set of princi-
ples to challenge the illegal status of his act. In this case, the principles
are those articulating our commitment to promoting a free market and
the free transferability of tide. The seller, in effect, claims that these
principles justify his act. This determines the moment of problematic
illegality. Under the formal rules of our system, the transaction is ille-
gal; under the free market principles of our legal culture, however, the
transaction is legitimate-it fosters the flow of commerce.
In order to resolve the problematic legal status of the seller, the
officials of the legal system must consider other principles as well. If
the transaction is legitimated and the title of the good faith purchaser
deemed good, then damage is done to the innocent original owner who
parts with his goods through the fraudulent conduct of another. More-
over, this resolution might encourage criminal activity by not prohibit-
ing the sale of the criminally obtained goods. If, however, the
transaction is held illegal, then the other innocent party, the good faith
purchaser for value, is harmed. In addition, such a determination
would be a departure from our principles of free transferability of title.
This dilemma is resolved, and the moment of legal illegality achieved,
by allowing the original owner an action against the seller but not
against the good faith purchaser, and by limiting the scope of the trans-
formation to cases in which the original owner has consented, albeit
through a deception, to the possession of the goods by the seller.9 '
This solution minimizes the harm to the original owner and discour-
ages more egregious criminal acts. It satisfies the competing principles
and resolves the dilemma in favor of the good faith purchaser without
derogation from the principles of the free market. 92 With this resolu-
must not mislead the reader. As the language of § 2-403 makes clear, it is the seller
"with voidable title" who "has power to transfer a good title." The pivotal moment of
the transformation focuses on the seller. The seller begins with a voidable title and ends
by selling a good title: this is the transformational aspect of the legal phenomenon that
must be explained.
90. If the seller did not act in this manner, then the prospective purchaser could
not be said to purchase the goods in good faith.
91. The transformation is prevented in all other cases by holding that a thief has a
void, rather than a voidable title. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Estes, 345 So. 2d 265, 266
(Miss. 1977) (individual who stole car from dealer's lot cannot convey title to good faith
purchaser because the thief has no title).
92. See 3 Anderson, supra note 87, at § 2-403:4 ("By favoring the innocent third
party, the Uniform Commercial Code endeavors to promote the flow of commerce by
placing the burden of ascertaining and preventing fraudulent transactions on the one in
the best position to prevent them, the original seller.").
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tion, the officials of the legal system deem the voidable title good and
the illegal transaction, in effect, legal.
B. Principles Without Rules
Not all situations that require legal determination occur with suffi-
cient regularity to warrant the existence of a rule that governs their
legal resolution. Some occur only once. Accordingly, only principles
are available to determine their legal significance. Such legal phenom-
ena are necessarily dualistic. The legality of the ratification of the
United States Constitution and the legitimacy of a successful revolu-
tionary government are examples of such phenomena.
The Articles of Confederation provided that they could only be al-
tered if any proposed change was "afterwards confirmed by the Legisla-
tures of every State."93 The Philadelphia Convention of 1787, which
composed and submitted to ratification the United States Constitution,
did not abide by this legal form. Instead, the Founders acted ultra vires
and included within the proposed constitution an article stating that,
when nine states had ratified it, the Constitution would be established
among those states.94 In accordance with this article, after ratification
by nine states, they declared the proposed constitution the Constitution
of the United States of America.
This historic episode poses a problem for the theory of constitu-
tional lawmaking:95 Was the ratification of the Constitution legal or
illegal? From a monistic point of view the ratification was plainly ille-
gal. A rule existed that dictated the legal form necessary for the pro-
cess "of ratification and the process actually adopted deviated from this
form. 96 While monistic theorists must end their narrative description
here, dualistic lawyers may simply cite this deviation, together with the
legal significance imposed on it, as the inaugural event in a narrative
describing the establishment of our constitutional government. Dual-
istic lawyers may then continue their narrative and explain why the rati-
93. Articles of Confederation art. XIII ("[Tihe Articles of this confederation shall
be inviolably observed by every state, and the union shall be perpetual; nor shall any
alteration at any time hereafter be made in any of them; unless such alteration be agreed
to in a Congress of the United States, and be afterwards confirmed by the Legislatures of
every State.").
94. U.S. Const. art. VII ("The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall
be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying
the Same.").
95. The approach to this problem used in the Note is based upon the analysis of-
fered by Professor Ackerman. See Ackerman, The Storrs Lectures: Discovering the
Constitution, 93 Yale L.J. 1013, 1020 (1984).
96. "The Federalists were ... perfectly aware of the problematic relationship of
their own "Convention" to the preexisting constitutional law of their time," notes Pro-
fessor Ackerman, "and that, especially in their decision to appeal to nine state 'Conven-
tions' for ratification, the Founders were designing a higher lawmaking procedure that
was plainly illegal under the Articles of Confederation." Id. at 1058.
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fication of the Constitution, despite its formal illegality, was legitimate
and legal.
The narrative that dualistic lawyers tell involves a structural trans-
formation- the transformation of an illegal ratification into a legal rati-
fication. The narrative description of this transformation revolves
around the three moments of formal illegality, problematic illegality,
and legal illegality.
As in other dualistic phenomena, by acting under a claim of right,
the members of the Philadelphia Convention challenged the characteri-
zation of their acts as ultra vires and illegal through the invocation of
principles-in this case the principles of self-government. 97 The mem-
bers of the Convention believed that they "might speak for the People
with greater democratic legitimacy than any assembly whose authority
arose only from its legal form." s98 "[I]n all great changes of established
governments," Madison observed, "forms ought to give way to sub-
stance . . . ."99 In this fashion, they rendered the character of their
acts one of problematic illegality.
No judge existed with sufficient authority to decide whether the
acts of the Philadelphia Convention were justified. Instead, the resolu-
tion of their problematic status had to wait for the popular acceptance
or rejection of their acts. The members of the Philadelphia Conven-
tion, as Madison remarked, "must have borne in mind that as the plan
to be framed and proposed was to be submitted to the people themselves,
the disapprobation of this supreme authority would destroy it forever;
its approbation blot out antecedent errors and irregularities."' 100 The
end of the story is well-known: the moment of legal illegality was
achieved; the transformation completed; the People accepted the act of
deviating from legal form as justified and, in an exercise of self-gover-
nance, adopted the United States Constitution.
The legitimacy of a successful revolutionary government is another
example of a dualistic legal phenomenon that occurs only infrequently.
The analysis of this legal phenomenon is analogous to the analysis of
the ratification of the United States Constitution. The formal illegality
involves the revolutionary acts, while the principles that render these
acts problematic are, for example, the principles of self-government.
In the moment of legal illegality, the resolution is achieved through
popular acceptance of the principles invoked by the revolutionaries.
97. It is essential to understand the special nature of the Philadelphia Convention.
The American Revolution had recently been fought and won. Now a select group of
American patriots were asked to convene and constitute a structure of government that
would endure and manifest the ideals and values of this revolution. It was to be the
American experiment in self-government. Toward this purpose, the Philadelphia Con-
vention acted under a claim of right and "asserted its own right to reverse preexisting
higher [constitutional] ratification procedures." Id. at 1060.
98. Id. at 1061 (emphasis in original).
99. The Federalist No. 40, at 252-53 J. Madison) (C. Rossiter ed. 1961).
100. Id. at 253 (emphasis in original).
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A dualistic analysis of revolution has two advantages over a monis-
tic positivist analysis. First, because dualistic lawyers recognize that the
illegal acts of the revolutionaries are, in effect, legalized, they need not
conclude that the change in governments has resulted in a discontinuity
within the legal system. Thus, legal dualists can explain the continuity
of laws and legal obligations between regimes. They may hold that a
single, continuous legal system has remained in place even though
there has been a revolutionary change of government. In contrast, a
positivist must recognize some form of discontinuity in all genuine rev-
olutions. 1 1 Second, a dualistic analysis enables a lawyer to discern le-
gitimate from illegitimate revolutionary governments. If the people
endorse the principles motivating the revolutionaries' claim of right,
the revolutionary government is legitimate. If the people do not en-
dorse these principles, then the revolutionary government is not legiti-
mate. 10 2 On a positivist theory, in contrast, this discrimination is not
possible. Either all revolutionary governments are considered illegal
101. In a positivist theory such as Professor Kelsen's, it is impossible to maintain
the continuity of the legal system from one regime to its revolutionary successor. This is
because, as Professor Kelsen maintains, the identity of a legal system is determined by
the chains of validation that relate legal rules and legal acts to their source of legal
validity within that system. If a rule or act cannot be related to the system's source of
legal validity, then it is not part of that system but part of another. Hence, in Professor
Kelsen's view, any deviation from the legal forms of a legal system creates a new legal
system. H. Kelsen, General Theory of Law and State 117, 219 (1945).
Professor Hart attempts to circumvent the problem of discontinuity by treating con-
tinuity and discontinuity as matters of degree and claiming that the success of some
revolutionaries is insufficiently "revolutionary" to disturb the continuity of the legal sys-
tem. Professor Hart writes that "[tihe stage at which it is right to say ... that the legal
system has finally ceased to exist is a thing not susceptible of any exact determination."
H.L.A. Hart, supra note 10, at 115. He claims further that "[a]lthough [a revolution]
... will always involve the breach of some of the laws of the existing system, it may
entail only the legally unauthorized substitution of a new set of individuals as officials,
and not a new constitution or legal system." Id. at 114-15.
Essentially, Professor Hart espouses a wait-and-see approach to determining the
continuity of a legal system. He must wait and see if the revolutionaries are successful
and, if so, how "revolutionary" they really are. The point remains, however, that he
believes that, with respect to the "revolutionary" revolutionaries, a break with the past
occurs. In this, he is like Professor Kelsen. The category of "unrevolutionary" revolu-
tionaries cannot be coherently maintained. See Finnis, Revolutions and Continuity of
Law, in Oxford Essays in Jurisprudence 44, 49-50 (A. Simpson ed. 2d series 1973). But
if it could be coherently maintained, their acts presumably would be illegal because they
deviated from the legal forms. Thus, in Professor Hart's theory, one is confronted with
a choice between, on one hand, legality of the revolutionary acts and discontinuity of the
legal systems and, on the other hand, illegality of the acts and continuity of the system.
In contrast to a dualistic analysis, Professor Hart appears unable to recognize the pair-
legality of the acts and continuity of the legal system-even though this seems the most
natural colligation. Of course, the dualistic lawyer can recognize the pair-illegality of
the acts and discontinuity of the legal systems- as well.
102. While this point is expounded from within a democratic framework, the condi-
tions of legitimacy may be reformulated to align with other ideological perspectives as
well.
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because they have violated the legal forms of the society in achieving
power, or they are all legal because they are now the authors of the
rules. In the former case, positivism will reject a government as illegiti-
mate even though it has the support of the governed, while, in the lat-
ter case, positivism will legitimate an oppressive regime that has come
to power through its military might and without popular acceptance.
CONCLUSION
The exclusive rule orientation of pure monistic positivism cannot
offer an adequate account of all legal systems. This failure has led
many theorists to adopt a version of mixed monism. This approach,
however, is also inadequate. By adhering to the positivist commitment
to separating law from any extralegal normative source, mixed monists
are led to embrace a conception of legal principles as descriptive, not
justificatory. This conception prevents them from describing, explain-
ing, or accounting for the possibility of complex legal phenomena-
such as adverse possession-in which the legal status of an act, event,
or relation is transformed from illegality to legality.
While legal positivism should be applauded for the analytical clar-
ity that it has brought to jurisprudence by separating it from the specu-
lative metaphysics of a bygone day, legal theorists must recognize the
limitations of this approach and accord legal principles a status in-
dependent of the rules of a legal system. An illusory departure from
positivism, like that of Professor Dworkin, is not enough. Legal dual-
ism offers this necessary independence. Even so, it is not a return to
natural law. Legal dualism simply gives the profound insights of the
natural lawyers their due: that principled arguments require principles
that are justificatory and that, in this respect at least, a legal system
must look beyond rules and derivative principles. Maintaining the ana-
lytical standards of positivism and these insights of natural law, it is
time to take the next step toward a genuine post-positivist reconstruc-
tion of legal theory.
Gregory M. Silverman
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